Turkey withdrew from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence — known internationally as the Istanbul Convention — on March 20, 2021. The withdrawal took effect on July 1, 2021. Turkey remains the only country to have ever withdrawn from the treaty, which it had been the first to ratify. Five years later, on April 22, 2026, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution formally urging Turkey to rejoin the Convention. The resolution arrives against a documented femicide record in Turkey: 429 women killed in 2024 in media-reported cases, the highest annual rate since 2010. This post lays out what the Convention required, what its withdrawal removed, and what the human cost has been.
The Istanbul Convention is the most comprehensive international treaty on violence against women. Drafted under Council of Europe auspices and opened for signature in Istanbul in 2011, it commits signatory states to:
Turkey’s ratification of the Convention in 2012 had been a landmark moment in Turkish women’s-rights advocacy. Domestic Law No. 6284 — Turkey’s primary domestic-violence statute — was substantially shaped by the Convention’s standards.
Withdrawing from the Convention did not, on its own, repeal Turkey’s domestic Law No. 6284. The statute remains on the books. But three things did change, and they have proven consequential:
The most-cited figure for 2024 is 429 women killed in femicides reported by Turkish media — compiled by the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), the leading Turkish NGO tracking the crisis. That figure is widely understood to undercount the actual rate, because:
UN agencies, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and a long list of independent monitors have flagged the same data: femicide rates in Turkey have risen, not fallen, since the Convention’s withdrawal took effect.
The PACE resolution of April 22, 2026 frames the consequence directly: women in Turkey “are being left without key protections,” and gender-based violence “remains widespread and underreported.”
The proximate cause of the March 2021 withdrawal was a presidential decree — issued, notably, by decree, without parliamentary approval. The decree’s legal basis was contested at the time and remains contested by Turkish constitutional scholars who argue that international human-rights treaties require legislative concurrence to be denounced.
The political backdrop is more useful than the legal pretext. Through 2018–2021, conservative coalition partners and religious-affairs constituencies had argued that the Convention’s framing — particularly its definition of gender, its non-discrimination provisions, and its protections that apply regardless of sexual orientation — was being used to advance positions inconsistent with traditional family policy. The withdrawal was the product of that internal political pressure, not of any documented harm caused by the Convention to Turkish institutions.
International observers, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, characterized the withdrawal at the time as a “worrying step backwards.” That language has held up.
PACE Resolution 2026/2649 does several specific things:
The resolution is not legally binding. But PACE resolutions have historically functioned as the political precursor to bilateral pressure from individual European foreign ministries, and they shape the framework against which Turkey’s EU candidacy is evaluated.
Turkish women’s-rights organizations — including the We Will Stop Femicide Platform, Mor Çatı, and the Federation of Women’s Associations of Turkey — have consolidated their demands around five specific points:
The fifth point connects to AST’s broader civil-society reporting: the same prosecutorial machinery used against journalists and lawyers has been used against women’s-rights advocacy organizations, particularly those whose work touches on Kurdish women, refugee women, or LGBTQ+ communities.
A separate strand of legal advocacy continues to challenge the constitutional validity of the 2021 withdrawal itself. The argument: a treaty ratified with parliamentary approval cannot be denounced by presidential decree alone. Multiple cases brought before Turkey’s Constitutional Court on this question were dismissed on procedural grounds in 2021–22. A reframed challenge is reportedly under preparation, building on the 2025–26 ECtHR jurisprudence that has consistently flagged Turkey’s Constitutional Court for failing to provide effective oversight (see related AST analysis on ECHR rulings).
Five things to take from the anniversary moment:
The Istanbul Convention was named for the city that hosted its drafting. Five years after Turkey’s withdrawal, the city is still where most of the international advocacy on the Convention’s future is centered. AST’s role is to make sure that advocacy stays grounded in the specific names, the specific cases, and the specific numbers — not in slogans.
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Sources: Turkish Minute, “PACE urges Turkey to rejoin Istanbul Convention, cites ongoing violence against women” (April 29, 2026); UN Western Europe, “Turkey’s withdrawal from women’s protection treaty, ‘worrying step backwards'”; International Commission of Jurists, “Turkey’s withdrawal from Istanbul Convention a setback for women and girls’ human rights”; UK Home Office Country Policy and Information Note on Turkey (July 2025); We Will Stop Femicide Platform annual data; Wikipedia, “Istanbul Convention” (consolidated).
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