The Origins of the Problem

Turkey’s struggle to draw the country more in line with the pillars of the European Union faced a long and accelerating slide. The country’s Freedom in the World score has been in free fall since 2014 due to an escalating series of assaults on the press, social media users, protesters, political parties, the judiciary, and the electoral system, as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan fought to impose personalized control over the state and society in a deteriorating domestic and regional security environment.

Turkey’s drift into the grip of authoritarianism began before the failed 2016 coup. The government’s heavy-handed response to nationwide Gezi Park protests in 2013, the start of a purge against members Gülen community after the corruption investigation in December 2013 paved the way for the emergence of an illiberal government. Many observers and experts pinpoint this year, 2013, as the major turning point for Turkey’s drift away from liberal democracy. The steady descent into an autocratic system leads to the full breakdown of the rule of law, judicial independence, and corrosion of the integrity of Turkey’s bureaucratic institutions following the sweeping purge after the failed coup attempt in 2016.

The signs of the conflict first came to surface after Erdoğan made clear his intentions to establish a more authoritarian rule with the powers vested by the 2011 referendum. The battle lines were drawn after the infamous graft operations of 17 and 25 December, in 2013, where prosecutors rounded up some politicians and businessmen who were under surveillance in a longitudinal investigation. Erdoğan said the corruption files were nothing but a sham, perpetrated by the Gülen movement as a soft coup in line with the interests of the foreign powers, which were envious of the Turkish rise as a global power.

Hizmet had long been hailed as the soft power for the country with its huge focus on education and humanitarian aid activities as well as interfaith dialogue efforts. “Gülen schools portrayed Turkey as a mystical but adaptable and open-minded country, and became a place for building intimate connections with elites and their children in dozens of countries.” Erdoğan used the movement’s international prevalence as a proof for his claim that it became the tool for the foreign powers.

When President Goes to War

Erdoğan has vowed on many occasions to uproot the Gülen Movement wherever it is. He did everything in his capacity, banking on the state power, and striking new partnerships with his old enemies against the Hizmet, which Erdoğan started calling the Parallel Structure. Erdoğan declared a “witch-hunt” against the movement, purging Gülen’s followers from public services, crippling its media power, erecting red-tape obstacles, cowing its institutions and companies with interminable inspections, etc. Finally, on July 15, 2016, a coup attempt, which Erdoğan declared Hizmet as the main perpetrator and used this argument to justify his undemocratic measures.

Erdoğan said: “Neither in the East nor in the West is a single member of this organization comfortable as before, nor will they be. If not today, then tomorrow, one day every member of the FETO traitors’ front will pay for his treason against the country and the nation.2 ” FETÖ, the abbreviation for the Fetullahist Terror Organization, was chosen by him to demonize the movement.

A Cultural Genocide

Erdoğan was not simply flapping his jaws. He has already been doing everything to make life unbearable for the Gülen followers inside the country. The coup attempt, which the Hizmet never claimed involvement in and renounced from the first moment, gave him an unquestionable and unchallenged excuse to completely disregard the current laws, as well as some international laws like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, under a state of emergency. What ensued was a witch hunt at an unprecedented frantic intensity.

According to the research conducted by the AST as of February 2020, investigations have been carried out on more than 610,000 people. The number of people arrested as a result of these investigations has already gone above 160,000 and counting. Currently, about 63,000 political prisoners are behind bars in the Turkish prisons. A total of 780 children are inside these overcrowded prisons, where their mothers endure agonizing troubles to raise them. 6,021 academics were expelled from their universities; whereas 15 private universities, which had affiliations with the Hizmet were shut down. 3,003 schools and dormitories were closed, millions of books were burned. Roughly 200 media outlets were seized and were either converted to pro-government mouthpieces or muzzled completely. 161 journalists were imprisoned. 4,463 judges or prosecutors were dismissed from public service and some were incarcerated. Tens of thousands of polices officers were axed. The licenses of 1,539 attorneys are currently under trial and 580 of them are in jail. 11 people died under arrest or during interrogation. 93 prisoners were killed due to torture and ill-treatment.

Globalizing the Theatre of War

Erdoğan also attempted to convince countries through carrot and stick policies or more diplomatic means to join his personal fight and do the same to the Hizmet members within their borders without heeding too much about what the rule of law by its very own nature requires. Various governments didn’t hesitate to jump on the bandwagon and yielded to the diplomatic pressure from Erdoğan to arrest and deport members of the Gülen Movement active in their countries. Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Georgia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkmenistan are some of these countries. In some countries, like Myanmar, Kosovo, Kazakhstan, and Sudan, the countries didn’t even follow their own laws while carrying out the deportations. In some countries, the local intelligence agencies cooperated to seize Gülen followers, while in some others, Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MİT) didn’t even need to ask for permission to stage an operation.

In Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Malaysia, and Pakistan, the domestic authorities blatantly violated international laws by deliberately deporting or letting Turkish intel agents kidnap Erdoğan’s opponents, who had applied for asylum or had UN protection against persecution.

Vicious Methods Inside the Country and Abroad

Although ascertaining the exact number is not easy, an estimated total of 130 people (refer to AST’s research) were abducted inside and outside Turkey through nefarious methods, brushing away even the most basic rights to fair trial and defense. Some of these people whisked away abroad by clandestine operations, were under the protection of the United Nations. They were subjected to heavy tortures, made to sign fake testimonies, turned into the living dead, and even murdered. Ankara was even accused of exploiting the Interpol system by submitting extradition requests for over 40,0003 individuals with arbitrary terror charges, revoking passports of the dissidents who struggle to survive as expats, issuing arrest warrants on fake accusations, etc. MİT organized covert operations to abduct and bring to Turkey mostly people with alleged ties with the Gülen movement, sometimes in collaboration with the relevant authorities of the country and in some other cases without even bothering to inform them.

Inside the country, certain figures were abducted in broad daylight. 29 people (refer to AST’s research) were registered as victims of enforced disappearance. A majority of these people were released, while some are feared to have been killed since no news has been heard from them for years now. Some of the survivors found the courage to tell the gory details of the torture they had been subjected to. Almost all of the people who were turned over to the police and were arrested show signs of heavy physical and psychological damage.

The Scope of the Report

The report consists of three parts. The introductory part will first offer a consolidated approach towards the nature of the war Turkish State has initiated against the Gülen movement, with an emphasis on Erdoğan’s passion for vengeance which has exacerbated the conditions for the Gülen followers. A thorough discussion over the abductions and enforced disappearances within the framework of international law will also be presented in the first part.

The second part will shed light on how the Erdoğan administration extended its operations against the Gülen movement followers all around the world by stipulating and examining all known cases around the world. The third part will deal with the enforced abductions in Turkey, also called the Black Transporter cases.

Part 1- Introduction

It is no secret that Turkey’s authoritarian political Islamist regime, headed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its ruler Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has long been suppressing opposition in the country. Hand in glove with the shady elements of the country’s former powerhouses, its fight against any kind of political dissent has been carried out through harsh measures that have often invoked the dark memories of the witch hunts of the Middle Ages.

As revealed in a myriad of incidents, the actions engaged by the Turkish state to squelch and muzzle the critics include a list of the most baleful forms of crimes against humanity. Hate crimes such as defamation and libel gush out in torrents every day from a colossal propaganda machine against any segment of the society that dares to position itself opposite the government. Once shunned as a despicable act even for the nation’s intelligence agency, profiling has become a daily routine of not only state institutions, but also some non-governmental organizations. The profiling files are published in national media outlets as if it is a most ordinary thing. Open or covert threats, physical attacks, and torture in the name of the state and for the “holy” purpose of saving the dignity of Erdoğan’s position are no longer counted as crimes. Nor is this all: those who use force towards this aim are revered and rewarded.

Among all these sinister crimes, this report will attempt to throw light upon one of the most contemptible, one that the state has been relentlessly committing recently under orders of Erdoğan: forced disappearances, abductions, and quid pro quo renditions of the dissidents in Turkey and abroad. It will also attempt to show how the autocratic regime has been employing state institutions as well as what appear to be non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as visible actors in the process of its persecutions.

Besides the fact that the magnitude of such efforts to silence, persecute the dissenting voices has not abated within the borders; the Turkish state has also escalated its cross-border operations against the dissenters. These unbridled and often reckless actions have caused in many cases problems in relationships with other governments since such engagements are a clear violation of international treaties. Such actions are considered a direct interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, as well as an unconcealed denial of their national sovereignty.

It goes without saying that these clandestine operations also pose a crime against humanity, and, as evident in the UN practices in similar cases, may become subject to international tribunal proceedings. Unfortunately, in this sense, Turkey has descended to become a part of the club of countries which hardly respect the foreign jurisdictions while conspiring against persons or communities they deem the enemy. North Korea stands out as a notorious example, as it uses enforced disappearances, abductions, renditions, and assassinations of political opponents as an ordinary practice to eradicate the figures it finds “inconvenient” for its stability. How unfortunate it is to see the public indifference in Turkey as Erdoğan steers the country, which had once been a regional model for its seemingly successful combination of Islam and democracy, towards the path of the most oppressive regimes of the world, with such despicable and inhumane actions of enforced disappearances, torture and murder.

An enforced or involuntary disappearance is a direct assault on human rights, which cannot be legitimized on any grounds in terms of international law. Neither can it be conceivably acceptable in terms of humanity and conscience. The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides a satisfactory definition for this crime. Proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992 as a body of principles for all States, the declaration defines an enforced disappearance as incidents in which “persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law”.4 How can one justify such a vicious act?

What is even worse is that the Turkish authorities have only rarely repudiated extreme and illegal measures to silence the opposition. On the contrary, the top government officials have boasted of them to win the favor of the masses for domestic political gains. Even bureaucrats from security and intelligence units have embraced such practices. The Turkish media, which has almost completely become a subservient tool of the government and a loyal amplifier to propagate Erdoğan’s messages to the masses, is brimming with success stories of how people are beaten and snatched in front of their children and wife or with “delightful” details of how these “bad guys” were whisked away from a foreign country — with or without the cooperation of the officials of that country — as if they were not talking about the devastation of real lives, but rather narrating fictional spy thrillers.

This report aims to put a particular focus on these devastated lives: to examine abductions and enforced disappearances by the Turkish state inside and outside its borders. It tries to include as many cases as possible by resorting to open resources, as well as by trying to get access to the personal accounts of those who survived.


The Erdoğan’s regime has traditionally made the capital of such shady methods to attack its enemies and the groups it sees detrimental to its core establishment. The Kurdish opposition, for instance, has long been a usual target for surreptitious assaults and assassinations. Likewise, leftist groups, communists, and Alevites have also been subjected to similar underhanded actions. During its fight to exterminate the Kurdish separatist insurgency, thousands of victims were vanished, especially in eastern and southeastern Anatolia. Even today, two decades after their disappearance, the mothers of abducted and most likely killed children meet every Saturday in İstanbul to ask for at least a graveyard for their children. In recent years, however, the main victims of the extrajudicial practices have been the members of the Gülen movement or Hizmet.

Gülen movement’s supporters mostly agreed with AKP’s policies that strengthened the country’s democratic institutions while forcing the anti-democratic elements of the established state to retreat. However, as Erdoğan became increasingly more enthusiastic to fill the void left behind by the defeated ancient régime with his own dictatorial desires, the relations between the two groups deteriorated. Erdoğan accused Hizmet of perpetrating a plot to topple his government in December 2013 with two graft operations that implicated some businessmen close to him as well as a few members of his government and started a massive campaign against the movement.

Here, a paragraph must be inserted to briefly recall the dramatic overturn of the relations between the AKP and Hizmet, which also marks the time when the country started severing its already flimsy connections with the rule of law. When Erdoğan’s network of shady relations was laid bare by the corruption operations, the politician promptly declared that his government was under attack by the global powerhouses which didn’t want Turkey’s rise again as a regional actor and that these secret organizations assigned Hizmet to finish off his party, the only hope for the revival of the old magnificence of the country. His declaration paved the way to justify his undemocratic measures and dark propaganda against members of the movement. In just a couple of days, he changed his rhetoric utterly from praising how aloof a movement of sincerity and devotion the Hizmet is, to how fiendish a demon it actually is and that it is responsible for all evil in the country. Erdoğan said Hizmet volunteered to become a puppet of the nation’s foreign enemies and so it is also the enemy of the people and for this very reason, a total annihilation would be good for everyone. This reasoning, inspired suddenly by the corruption cases, interestingly convinced Turks, possibly owing to the extremely loyal media power Erdoğan has and to the general inclination of ordinary Turkish people towards accepting conspiracy theories. The further away the conspiracy theories are from reality, the more credible they become, especially when they are repeated by such a powerful figure as Erdoğan. The politician lost no time in hitting the roads and started public rallies all around Turkey, sometimes in three different cities in a single day, to tell the same lies to the masses, while every single message from his mouth was multiplied by the media to reach millions over and over again. At the same time, the prosecutors and law enforcement officers who had participated in the corruption operations were either demoted or assigned to insignificant units, contrary to current laws. Erdoğan’s next step would be to seek cooperation against the common enemy with the former actors of the deep state, who had been forced to retreat after their coup plans were exposed.

A systematic and sweeping purge of the critical figures in the state bureaucracy ensued; the victims were largely the people affiliated with the movement. Following the failed coup of July 15 in 2016, which Erdoğan blamed on Hizmet and its leader, the purge became even more widespread, and the methods turned more vicious.

Hizmet had been labeled as a terror organization by Erdoğan’s cabinet as per the recommendations of the National Security Council (MGK), a still powerful unit of the former regime, but a considerable portion of the domestic public opinion was still in favor of Hizmet, as the movement had always praised peace over violence, dialogue over conflict and education over everything else. Gülen had frequently maligned anyone resorting to terror in the name of Allah as non-believers and the most dangerous enemies of Islam; therefore, many were still shrugging off Erdoğan’s defamation campaigns and his continuous attributions of terror to Gülen and his followers. But after the July 15th botched coup attempt, with the help of a torrential flood of a one-sided narration of the coup details, it didn’t take long until public opinion completely turned against Hizmet and its leader, even though they were disavowing the coup repeatedly from the first moment on. With the help of an enormous public outrage against anything and anyone related to the Gülen movement, Erdoğan found the strength and excuse to disregard any obligation to stick to laws, fairness, and mercy. When he shouted in public rallies that all Hizmet followers must be exterminated, he got applause. When he ordered the plunder of the properties of Hizmet members, he got cheers. When he asked people to snitch on their relatives and friends from Hizmet, he got standing ovations.

Profiling and persecution of members of the Gülen movement was now not only a leisure pursuit of ordinary people, but also a task assigned to the state’s institutions, government agencies, AKP bureaus, and elected and appointed local administrators from governors to chiefs of villages.

Embassies were also commissioned with coordinating the profiling and spying activities on the expat members of the Hizmet movement. These missions included a variety of operations from mere intelligence gathering and stalking to threatening, harassing, and even physically assaulting the critics of Erdogan. It is quite likely that embassies have also been actively involved in the preparation and logistics phases of abductions and renditions. The mastermind and executer of the operations was Turkey’s main spy body, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), as well as the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA), were also active participants in the covert intel operations around the world.

Ironically, the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet) also joined the lynch party as a voluntary contributor to the assignment by the MİT to identify people critical of Erdoğan within expat communities, in clear contradiction to the obligatory assignment by the religion to help these people become brothers and friends.

Turkish preachers from the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DİTİB) have been actively employed in these intelligence-gathering activities at the government’s request. Even though these were initially said to be “false media claims,” Secretary-General Bekir Alboğa later confessed that “a few” imams provided information to the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

Furthermore, as per later news, German police investigations revealed that these accusations may only be the tip of the iceberg, meaning that such efforts could be taking place across Europe, such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium.

State-run news companies, Anatolia News Agency (AA) and Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), spared no effort to follow the dissenting figures and make sensational stories about them in the countries where they operated. The Yunus Emre Institute and the Maarif (Education) Foundation, which acted hand in glove with the Turkish government to forcibly seize the educational institutions built and operated by the Hizmet movement in various countries, were also active participants in the clandestine warfare against the Gülen movement across the world.

Last but not least, government-funded private think tanks and organizations like the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD), the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), and the Turkish Heritage Organization, must be counted among the essential actors. They organized panels, conferences, and events, as well as issued a variety of publications, to disseminate ideas designed to bleach the government’s extrajudicial, arbitrary, and inhumane actions as inevitable measures taken at extraordinary times. They have also vied to garner support for Erdoğan and his party among Turkish communities while at the same time collecting information about the owners of the voices against Erdoğan within these communities.

Based on such underhanded investigations and espionage, the Erdoğan’s regime would first ask the rendition of its critics from the countries they were lawfully residing in. Depending on the nature of its relations with them, Turkey first asks through legitimate channels for the deportation of the people it is seeking. If this step proves unsuccessful, Turkey then attempts to offer bribes or use its influence to pressure these countries to hand over the wanted persons. The different milestones of this path are formulated in a report by the EU’s Open Dialogue Foundation: “When non-democratic states do not succeed in attaining extradition by legitimate methods, extra procedural forced expulsions (case of the employees of the Turco-Moldovian lyceum Orizont) or abductions (case of Vladimir Yegorov, Aleksandr Frantskevich, Murdali Khalimov) of the wanted persons often take place. Such actions are implemented on the basis of cooperation between the law-enforcement agencies and special services of both states, in secret, without observing lawful procedures, thus depriving persons of the opportunity to defend their interests in court (cases of Abdullah Büyük, Aminat Babayeva, Yusuf İnan, Salih Zeki Yiğit, Alma Shalabayeva, Muratbek Tungishbayev, Zhaksylyk Zharimbetov).

Enforced Disappearances in International Law

Enforced disappearances have universally been categorized as some of the most heinous crimes that can possibly be committed by malicious state actors. All relevant instruments of international law expressly forbid enforced disappearances, given that the act entirely circumvents avenues of due process while inflicting undue trauma upon both the abducted and the relatives of the abducted.

In a straightforward definition of “forced disappearance”, the Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons states, “forced disappearance of persons is… a grave and abominable offense against the inherent dignity of the human being.” The Convention also adds, “forced disappearance of persons violates numerous non-derogable and essential human rights” and reaffirms that the systematic practice of disappearance “constitutes a crime against humanity.” The International Criminal Court expands upon this definition of enforced disappearance, detailing it as the “arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”
Finally, one of the most recent instruments of international law, the 2006 Convention on Enforced Disappearance, Article 1, provides an indubitably worded right to all persons:

“No one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance.”

A signatory to the United Nations’ Conventions, the Republic of Turkey has violated international laws and the human rights of its victims in all countries detailed in this report. Furthermore, the Turkish administration has utilized baseless national security arguments to justify its egregious behavior across the world. The Turkish government’s unabashed attempts to terrorize Turkish nationals across the world has violated the sovereignty of states in 16 known cases detailed here. International law prohibits the use of enforced disappearance under all circumstances as follows:

“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for enforced disappearance.”

The Republic of Turkey, the current Turkish government is overseen by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and all relevant actors involved in the process of terrorizing, abducting, and transporting people around the world to further their objectives continually violate widely recognized international laws, national sovereignty of countries subject to such operations, and local rules and regulations of relevant countries. In sum, the Erdogan Regime and its constituent parts, especially members of the intelligence community taking part in worldwide operations have committed crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity have no statute of limitations.

Turkey’s extraterritorial incursions to kidnap dissidents and its similarly egregious actions in its own jurisdiction have been substantiated with many cases, and this report will attempt to shed light on as many cases as possible. Nonetheless, one needs to first examine the grounds the Turkish authorities base their actions on.

On April 17, 2014, the Turkish Parliament empowered the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) with the legal authority to conduct undercover missions outside Turkey’s borders with a critical change in Law number 2937. Another important change was introduced in 2017 with the decree-law number 694 that rendered the MİT subordinate directly to the presidency and the President was assigned as the chair of the National Intelligence Coordination Council (MİKK), which would become the main strategy-making body for MİT’s moves outside Turkey.11 MİT now became able to realize to-the-point operations without facing any impediments that could have arisen if parliament had not been bypassed by attaching the agency directly to the almighty presidential post.

As we will discuss in the proceeding parts, although the domestic reactions to the MİT’s covert operations inside and outside the country have been limited, they garnered huge repulsion from certain states and international organizations, as its actions were perceived as a form of deprivation of liberty.

An individual’s right to liberty can be compromised so long as it is in compliance with international law. Article 9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights clearly defines the arbitrary deprivation of liberty as a lack of respect to grounds and procedures prescribed by law. Both articles provide in indisputable terms the conditions that any individual must be well informed, promptly or at the time of arrest, of the reasons for their arrest and of any charges against them in case of arresting. Furthermore, any individual must be brought before a judge or a similar judicial authority without delay.

However, in Turkey’s practice, people are abducted without even knowing what their crimes are or who exactly has captured them. They appear in court only after months of heavy tortures, if they are lucky to live long enough. Indeed, they can’t see even the faces of their abductors or torturers, much less their lawyers or families.

Turkey’s abduction operations abroad have in some cases been in cooperation with the hosting countries, while in others, the Turkish operational units simply utilized underhanded methods, drawing strong reactions from those countries. For example, the Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh denounced the abduction attempt of the Turkish teacher Veysel Akçay on the grounds that “it is an unacceptable act of violation of Mongolia’s sovereignty and independence and Mongolia will strongly object it.” The Turkish Ambassador in Ulaanbaatar would, without a moment to spare, reject any kind of knowledge or involvement in the operation.

Another harsh backlash came from Kosovo after Turkey kidnapped five teachers and a medical doctor who had affiliations with the Gülen movement. Kosovar Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj fired his interior minister and spy chief for their alleged complicity. Kosovo’s Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a stern statement in which it said, “the arrest and deportation of the Turkish citizens with a regular residence permit … is … in direct contradiction to international norms.”13 Erdoğan lambasted Kosovo’s PM, who had said the followers of the Gülen movement “were not deported but were stolen,” as if he was talking to one of his underlings or to any Turk who dared to question him, saying Haradinaj would “pay” for what he did. Enver Robelli, a prominent Kosovar journalist, told Al-Monitor about Erdoğan’s unbridled disparagement of the Kosovar PM: “People are irritated that Erdogan attacks the prime minister. Most [local] media [report that] Erdogan behaves as if he were the king of Kosovo.”

Nate Schenkkan from the Washington Post wrote, “The idea that Turkish intelligence would brazenly abduct its citizens from a country with which it has putatively good relations is a shocking offense against both international human rights standards and bilateral norms.”14 Schenkkan elaborated on Turkey’s flagrant “transnational repression.”15 He asserted that Turkey has pursued an aggressive policy to silence its perceived enemies in at least 46 countries.

Additionally, he recounted the allegations that it was abusing the Interpol as a political tool to target its opponents. “Ankara has revoked thousands of passports and achieved the arrest, deportation, or rendition of hundreds of Turkish citizens from at least 16 countries, including many who were under UN protection as asylum seekers. It has successfully pressured at least 20 countries to close or transfer to new owners dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Gülen movement schools,” he wrote.

The regime’s blatant moves against the followers of the Gülen movement have also been registered in detail by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its annual country reports since 2017. The report wrote under the Torture and Ill-Treatment in Custody section in 2017: “Cases of torture and ill-treatment in police custody were widely reported through 2017, especially by individuals detained under the anti-terror law, marking a reverse in long-standing progress, despite the government’s stated zero tolerance for torture policy. There were widespread reports of police beating detainees, subjecting them to prolonged stress positions and threats of rape, threats to lawyers, and interference with medical examinations.”17 The report mentioned the abductions by “unidentified perpetrators believed to be state agents” in at least six cases. The report for 2018 marked the continuation of allegations of torture, ill-treatment, and cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment in police custody and prison and the lack of any meaningful investigation into them as a source of deep concern. Furthermore, it would also lambaste the lack of any effective investigations into these serious assertions by the judiciary.

The same report for the next year recorded only exacerbation in these sources of concern without any sign of progress.19 Different from the previous reports, it would point to a pervasive culture of impunity for members of the security forces and public officials implicated. The report would also criticize in harsh terms Turkey’s barring of the publication of reports on the findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) in their two visits to detention places in Turkey. “Turkish authorities continued to seek the extradition of alleged Gülen supporters, many of them teachers, from countries around the world. Countries that complied with Turkey’s requests bypassed legal procedures and judicial review. Those illegally extradited in this way were detained and prosecuted on return to Turkey,” the report asserted.

Confessing Abductions

Despite undeniable evidence that the enforced disappearances were carried out openly or covertly by several state institutions, mainly by the intelligence and the security units, different government representatives and bodies have vehemently rejected accusations in their official statements. Despite that, their deliberate or on-impulse confessions are available even in the sources that are publicly accessible. Although it is universally accepted as a heinous transgression of the basic human rights and is widely shunned, Turkish authorities have interestingly defended abductions of dissidents in Turkey or abroad, not in blurted-out blunders but in deliberately stated confirmations. In the following paragraphs, some examples of such remarks will be highlighted.

Before proceeding with its abductions, Turkey first tried to capture the dissidents through formal mechanisms and within internationally approved norms, such as requesting the extradition of Gülen movement members. But as its demands were turned down in some countries, especially in the democratic world where the supremacy of law is respected, the Turkish government started to use extrajudicial ways like abductions to bring these people back.

Thinly-Veiled Threats by the Politicians

Turkish president Erdoğan has encouraged his loyalists time and again to make life unbearable for Hizmet followers and ordered law enforcement units and intelligence officers to kidnap his critics and punish them, even hinting vaguely of their murders. For instance, in one of his speeches, he said: “Some countries eliminate terrorists whom they consider as a threat to their national security, wherever they are. This means they accept that Turkey has the same right.” He then hinted about his target: “This includes the terrorists they shake hands with and praise. I hope we will have good news for the nation on this matter soon.”

In one of his early statements in September 2016, he would say that “no country or region around the world will ever be a safe haven for FETÖ and its militants.” The Turkish autocrat described the members of the Gülen movement as cancer cells that must be exterminated, leaving no remnants. “Those who fled abroad before or in the murky atmosphere of the coup d’état should never feel safe. … The children of this country should return and tell whatever they know to the relevant authorities. If they don’t, they’ll pay for it. At any rate, we won’t support them as our citizens. … We will take due action wherever they are captured,” he said.

Similar comments would spill from Erdoğan’s mouth during a joint press conference with Kosovar President Hashim Thaçi in Ankara on December 29, 201624: “Our crackdown on them both at home and abroad is underway and will continue to be the case in the future. Wherever they flee, we will be hot on the heels of the leaders and militants of terrorist organizations.”

Former Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ nonchalantly admitted that Ankara’s spy agency “bundled up and brought back” 80 suspects against their will, as part of their global response to so-called threats to Turkey’s security from the Hizmet movement. He also called the capture of Turkish dissident s from Kosovo, which had caused a serious commotion in that country, as “a great success.”

Commenting on the Kosovo abductions on the state-run TRT radio, Erdoğan’s lawyer Hüseyin Aydın also said similar abductions by the Turkish intelligence would continue. The Kosovo operation was not marking any “paradigm shift” for the MİT, and it wasn’t the first of its kind, said Aydın. “Fugitive Gülenists will walk looking behind their backs all the time. The National Intelligence Organization will continue its operations everywhere. After the government’s success at home, there was a need to carry out operations targeting the movement’s overseas network,” he threatened.

Following suit, the other members of the Turkish government, as well as loyal followers of the president, have expressed similar thoughts. There have been repeated calls for kidnapping, killing and torturing of Gülen followers from these circles; nevertheless, even though these are heinous hate crimes, prosecutors simply turn a deaf ear to any such threats if they are leveled against Hizmet members. This is a public craze, an unfathomable intemperance that is hardly tolerated even under actual war conditions. Even warring sides try to avoid atrocities against civilians, especially children, the elderly and women. However, different units of the state and the civilians, chiefly Erdoğan himself and his zealot loyalists, have repeatedly called for abduction and torture, even murder, of any Hizmet member in Turkey or abroad — even if they are elderly or women — and the plunder of their properties.

Erdoğan’s son-in-law even publicly encouraged the AKP zealots to kill Gülen movement followers, saying he would butcher them wherever he sees them without even batting an eyelid.27 While talking to a group of students that were granted scholarships to study abroad, Berat Albayrak said, “This gang of traitors is now pouring their poison and treason in cooperation with a disgusting ‘diaspora network’ all around the world to smear and betray this nation and this religion abroad. … If I were you, I would not have been able to restrain myself, I would have butchered them wherever I saw them. … These fugitives, stateless traitors, live very normal lives,” he added.

Erdoğan’s spokesperson İbrahim Kalın, as he was answering questions from the press on September 21, 2018, said, “Now, look, it may be the US or some other places, other countries in which the FETÖ nested, or some other regions, the operations by our relevant units and institutions in these places will continue uninterrupted. Therefore, they will continue feeling the breath of the state of the Turkish Republic on their necks. No one must ever doubt about this. Of course, I am not able to give you any details as to which countries, here or there, but anything may happen at any place. Let me express that our president has a clear order on this matter and that our units have been conducting professional efforts at the fullest possible extent. There may be operations in other regions, too, similar to the one in Kosovo. The Turkish Republic will not allow FETÖ to inhale a peaceful breath, everyone must know this.”28 The Kosovo operation he was referring to had stirred a huge backlash in the Balkan country as its Prime Minister stepped up to sack the internal minister and the head of the security forces for their negligence, which tainted the country’s sovereignty and made Kosovo seem like an unchecked and unprotected field where the agents of other countries could freely do whatever they want.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said on April 4, 2017, “We do not stop chasing after them [Gülen movement participants] at home and abroad. We are breathing down their necks. We won’t give these traitors and dishonorable people room to breathe.”29 He would repeat the same threats over and over again by using the exact same words in a venomous tone as he spoke in Antalya in February 2019: “We are breathing down their necks. We will grab their necks and bring them back to Turkey. We will make the whole world a dungeon for them. We are hot on their heels all across the world. We are closing their associations, schools. We are closing down them all, or we are making them closed down. Lastly, Pakistan Constitutional Court declared them a terror organization.”

In some other incidents, the Turkish authorities revealed their plans to resort to underhanded operations against the members of the Gülen movement. Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu, for example, asserted on March 2017 that the Turkish state units have plans to whisk away the opposition figures, who had escaped the AKP persecution and sought refuge in Germany as political asylees. “One day, these FETÖ terrorists may be shocked to see where they are located, you know. I’m telling you from here, it is not that easy.”31 In one of the most famous such incidents that also kicked up a row in the US, the US President Donald Trump’s national security adviser Mike Flynn allegedly discussed with representatives from the Turkish government a $15-million offer in exchange for delivering Fethullah Gülen to Turkey.32 This single case alone depicts the exorbitant plots the Turkish government has schemed and ventured even in the US, much less the countries with less established democratic institutions. Within its own borders and abroad, the Turkish government will continue to round up and bring in the dissidents to fill its currently-under-construction 228 new prisons.

Threats From Loyalists

Pro-government figures not only from politics but also from the media, also encouraged abduction, torture, and killing of government dissidents in Turkey and abroad. Erdoğan’s former speechwriter Aydın Ünal, for instance, penned threats bluntly against the Hizmet members in his column in a pro-government media outlet. The following quote is taken verbatim from his column in Erdoğan’s Yeni Şafak newspaper: “Certain Fetullahists continuing to live does not serve the interests of neither Gülen nor U.S. intelligence. They should prepare for the extrajudicial organization executions approaching, rather than conduct an operation through the judicial theater.”34 When he wrote these lines, he was also an MP of Erdoğan’s party. He claimed that the Hizmet would do something like this to journalists in exile since their lives would no longer “serve the interests of the movement.” These lines, however, were nothing but providing an early excuse for the MİT’s covert operations to assassinate these dissidents.

Another pro-government journalist, Cem Küçük, made an even direr statement. During a live television program, he insisted Turkish intelligence agencies kill family members of people who were arrested over their (alleged) affiliations with the Gülen movement. He was very critical even about the prosecutors, who had notoriously been very tough on the followers of the Gülen movement, accusing these prosecutors of being excessively lenient. He suggested that instead of asking questions and taking answers in conventional ways, the detained people must be subjected to a variety of tortures during their enforced stays in prisons. One of his suggestions to effectively convince Hizmet members to confess their attributed crimes was to “to hang them out of the window by their legs.”

Unfortunately, the Turkish state is already executing much worse cruelty against the alleged members of the movement. There are innumerable grueling accounts of how Hizmet members are treated in prisons.

The threats that come from Erdoğan’s zealot followers must also be noted. There have been countless physical assaults against members of the Hizmet movement inside Turkey, but there are concrete signs that the acts of intimidation and cannonade are being deliberately organized in other countries as well. For example, some German press outlets reported that AKP MP Metin Külünk was ostensibly providing funds for the Turkish “Ottoman Germania” gangs. There are surveillance camera records showing this politician in contact with the gang members while allegedly giving them money. A ZDF news reported evidence that Ottoman Germania was indeed assigned to carry out attacks on the Turkish dissidents living in the country. A former member of the European Parliament Ozan Ceyhun wrote on social media, “Gülenists in Germany will have many sleepless nights. We owe that to our martyrs.” Likewise, Dursun Baş, the chairman of the German branch of the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD), addressed two members of Stiftung Dialog und Bildung via Twitter, saying, “How do you dare to go out on the streets? For you, there will be no easy death.”

Sedat Peker, a mafia leader who was released from prison by Erdoğan in 2014, openly threatened dissidents with death but was acquitted by the court without even a slight warning, much less due to punishment. Peker, who was embraced by Erdoğan on many occasions and has very close relations with the youth of Erdoğan’s party, said, “We will force into the jails after hanging all of whomever we catch on the trees, flag poles. We will hang them in the jails as well. We will hang them on the poles from their necks,” and the court accepted these words as nothing more than normal expression of one’s opinions. People quit attending mosques for regular prayers due to the fear of getting assaulted by partisans, and their buildings were stoned or burnt by arson even in major European countries. Turkish businessman Ali Ekrem Kaynak was killed in Amsterdam sometime after he was verbally and physically assaulted by Erdoğan loyalists over his proximity to the Hizmet movement. There have been similar incidents in the US as well.

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This document is the translation of the vote of the Federal Supreme Court’s Minister Edson Fachin, rapporteur on the extradition process against Ali Sipahi; a Hizmet inspired businessman, who was arrested on April 5, 2019, on his return from the U.S. The arrest request was made by the Turkish Government. The lawsuit was opened after the coup in 2016, and the content is the same/similar to thousands of other absurd arrests like being part of a terrorist organization (referring to members of the Hizmet Movement), for having an account with Bank Asya (which was a commercial bank and was in legal operation until it was closed after a coup in 2016), being a representative of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in Belo Horizonte and supporting the Cultural Center. 

Pre-trial detention in the case of extradition requests is the rule in Brazil. So, Ali was immediately arrested on landing in Brazil. He spent 34 days in prison at the federal police headquarters in São Paulo. After extensive media coverage and the reaction from society in general, his case was analyzed faster than normal, and a hearing was scheduled for 06.08.2019 for the second panel of the Supreme Court, which has five members. 

At this hearing, in addition to Ali’s lawyers, other entities defended him against this extradition, as amicus curiae. The result was five votes to 0, and Ali was acquitted. Each minister made a long statement explaining their votes. The lack of independent justice in Turkey, the reality of torture for prisoners; the non-existence of independent powers; the content of the political accusation of the process, which is not considered a crime in Brazil; that the Hizmet movement is not a terrorist organization; the absurd numbers of prisoners right after the attempted coup and the direction that Turkey has been taking since then were cited as the reasons for the non-extradition. All these facts make it clear that the country has entered an authoritarian regime, and baseless charges against critics and opponents are standard in those regimes, and this process is one of those. 

The collective ruling that reports the votes of the five ministers was not ready until the translation of that document. But, as Minister Edson Fachin was rapporteur of the process, his vote serves as a summary of other votes and the positioning of the Supreme Court of Brazil. 


Link for the original in Portuguese:

Mr. Fachin (Rapporteur): The request for extradition for investigative purposes was submitted through diplomatic channels by the Government of Turkey to the detriment of its national ALI SIPAHI, through Note Verbale No. 694/2019, on the basis of the promise of reciprocity for similar cases. 

The Turkish Government has submitted a request for the extradition of ALI SIPAHI, based on the promise of reciprocity for similar cases, according to the provisions of Article 84 (2) of the Law 13.445/2017. 

The Ankara Court of Peace (Turkey) issued a warrant of arrest No. 7 dated 26 June 2018 for investigation 2017/1204200. The acts attributed to the extradition were allegedly committed in the city of Ankara, Turkey, and are allegedly part of the Fethullah Güllen Armed Terrorist Organization/The Parallel State Structure (FETÖ/PDY), which is subject to imprisonment of between 7.5 and 15 years, in accordance with Articles 314/2, 53/1, 58/9 and 63 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Turkey, as well as Articles 5/1 and 7/1 of its Anti-Terrorist Law. 

Typical behaviors were described in the application: 

“In a phone call on December 25, 2013, Fetullah Gülen, who is the leader of the Armed Terrorist Organization of Fethullah Gülen/The Parallel State Structure (FETÕ/PDY) was examined by the Ankara Public Prosecutor’s Office in the framework of investigation 2014/37666 (…. ) ordered the members of the Organization to put money from their personal accounts in Bank Asya, the bank of the Fethullah Gülen/A Parallel State Structure (FETÕ/PDY). 

(…) following Fethullah Gülen’s order, the defendant ALI SIPAHI deposited money in his bank account at Banco Asya, between 31 December 2013 and 24 December 2014, in the amount of 1,721.38 Turkish liras. 

(…) As a result, he supported the terrorist organization with funding. 

I will now examine the grounds provided for in the recent Migration Law (Law 13,445/2017): 

  1. Extradition of a naturalized Brazilian 

Preliminarily, I eliminate the obstacle provided for in article 5, LI, of the Constitution, since the exception provided for in the same constitutional provision applies to the species, since it concerns the extradition of a naturalized Brazilian, who is attributed with typical conduct practiced before naturalization. 

The subject of this extradition case, ALI SIPAHI, a Turkish national, born on 1 July 1988, of Ahmet Sipahi and Gulser Sipahi, resident of the State of São Paulo, obtained Brazilian citizenship by naturalization on 19 October 2016 (Ordinance No. 213, of 13 October 2016). 

The crimes attributed to him would have been committed in the years 2013 and 2014, in a period prior to naturalization, which took place in 2016, without the constitutional obstacle. 

  1. Non-retroactivity of Brazilian criminal law 

The offense of armed terrorist organization is provided for in Article 314.1 of the Turkish Criminal Code (No. 5237) with a prison sentence of 10-15 years. The defendant’s conduct is also covered by the Turkish Anti-Terror Law 3713/1991, as amended in 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, and 2010. 

In the Brazilian legal system, Law 13.260/2016 disciplines terrorism and reformulates the concept of terrorist organization: 

Art. 6 Receiving, providing, offering, obtaining, conserving, keeping in deposit, requesting, investing in any form, directly or indirectly, resources, assets, goods, rights, securities or services of any nature, for the planning, preparation or execution of the offenses provided for in this Act: 

Sentence – confinement, fifteen to thirty years. 

However, the retroactive application of Brazilian criminal law does not seem feasible. As noted above, the extradition request reports that the events took place between 31 December 2013 and 24 December 2014, during which time “on the order of Fethullah Gülen, the accused ALI SIPAHI deposited 1,721.38 Turkish liras into his bank account at Bank Asya”. 

The Brazilian legislation that complies with the constitutional mandate, typifying the crime of terrorism, only came to light on 16 March 2016, with the publication of Law No. 13,260 of that year. 

At the time of the practice of the accused conducts, there was no criminalization in the common Brazilian criminal law, with the obstacle of the non-retroactivity of the Brazilian criminal law and, therefore, the impracticability of extradition. 

In this regard, the Court has already noted in a vote to stone the dean of this Supreme Court, Min. Celso de Mello:

“The legal meaning of the constitutional principle of the reservation of the law with regard to the classification and commission of crimes (CF, art. 5, point XXXIX, nullum crime nulla poena sine praevia lege. Double criminality: criterion governing the extrajudiciall system. The need for the fact underlying the request for extradition (or the request for provisional arrest for extrajudicial purposes) to be simultaneously criminalized, at the time of its practice, both in Brazilian and in foreign State’s criminal legislation. (…) Innocent situation in the case, since the punishable conduct attributed to the denounced foreign subject only began to be considered criminal in Brazil, in April 2013 (when the vacatio legis period of Law 12.737/2012, art. 4, was exhausted). Therefore, subsequently, until the date, it was allegedly practiced in the United States of America”. (EPP 732-QO, Min. Celso de Mello, trial 11/11/2014, Second Class, DJE 02/02/2015. 

In another trial, the Court ruled, also under the direction of Justice Rapporteur Celso de Mello: 

Extradition and dual criminality. ….provided that the act charged constitutes a crime under the dual perspective of the legal systems in force in Brazil and in the foreign State that requires the application of the extradition measure. (…) What really matters, in the evaluation of the double criminality postulate, is the presence of the structuring elements of the criminal type (essentialia delicti), as defined in the primary incrimination precepts contained in the Brazilian legislation and in force in the positive order of the requesting State, independently of the formal designation they attribute to the criminal acts. 

(Ext. 953, Rel. Min. Celso de Mello, a sentence of 28 September 2005, Plenary, DJ of 11/11/2005). 

The first obstacle to extradition is, therefore, the absence of double criminality, which is why Brazilian terrorism law is post- facto and, therefore, inapplicable. The essential requirement of double criminality has therefore not been met. 

  1. Characterization of political crimes 

The second obstacle to granting the extradition request lies in the political characterization of the criminal conduct attributed to the extraditing party. 

According to the charges made in the extradition trial, the extraditing ALI SIPAHI, following an order from the religious leader, deposited money in the bank account of the aforementioned institution, which would have occurred between 31 December 2013 and 24 December 2014 in the amount of 1721.38 Turkish liras, when Brazilian legislation did not yet classify the conduct charged with extradition as terrorism

It could be argued that the conduct would fall within the criminal types contained in the National Security Act, Act No. 7,170, in force since 14 December 1983, when, in which the conduct imputed to the accused is concerned, has the following description: 

Art. 16 – Integrate or maintain an association, party, committee, class entity or group that aims to modify the current regime or the rule of law, by violent means or with the use of serious threats.

Sentence: Confinement, 1 to 5 years.

Art. 17 – Attempt to change, by the use of violence or serious threat, the order, the current regime, or the rule of law.

Sentence: Prison, 3 to 15 years.

Single Paragraph – If the serious bodily injury occurs, the penalty is increased by half; if death occurs, it is increased by twice. 

The jurisprudence of this Court has already recognized that, at least in the specific legislation, political crimes are those defined in Law No. 7,170/83, which defines crimes against national security and political and social order. In this line of interpretation, the conduct with which the accused is charged would be provided for in the national security law and, ipso facto, would also be characterized as a political offense. 

The scope of the prohibition of extradition for political offenses is reflected in foreign doctrine. In Ivan Anthony Shearer’s work, we find the beginnings of the fence: 

The exception for political offenses first appeared in the extradition treaty between Belgium and France in 1834. 

The philosophical concepts generated by the French Revolution encouraged participation and political change and legitimized resistance to tyrannical rule. Therefore, granting asylum to political offenders was conceived as a duty in almost all cases. 

One of the first countries to adopt specific domestic legislation exempting political offenders from extradition was Belgium in 1833. The first treaty on the exemption from the political offence of extradition appeared in the treaty between France and Belgium in 1834. 


Steven Lubet and Morris Czackes put the latest concerns in the field of political dissidence and the necessary protection of individual freedom: 

The growing concern for individual freedom, political dissent and human rights in the world has recently given rise to several international representations. International concern may have peaked with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948. The authors of the Declaration sought to promote an uninhibited political debate by providing foreign nations with the possibility of granting asylum to those accused of political acts. 

The exception for political crimes is not limited to non-violent dissent; revolutionary or counter- revolutionary violence can also be protected from extradition. While this view may occasionally lead to unpleasant results, it is clear that revolution enters the realm of political activity. However, certain acts of violence, which exist on the fringes of the legitimate revolution, call into question the ability to protect such activities from extradition and punishment. 

(Steven Lubet, Morris Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 193 (1980) 

As for the definition of political crimes, the Federal Supreme Court has embraced the subjective doctrine, understanding that specific malice – a special purpose of action, embodied in the political desideratum – is necessary to perfect the political offence: 

1- As the Constitution does not define a political offence, it is up to the interpreter to do so taking into account the specific case and the law in force. 

2- A political offence only exists when the assumptions of Article 2 of the National Security Law (Law 7,170/82) are met, to which are added those of Article 1: the materiality of the conduct must impair or expose, actually or potentially, the danger of injury to national sovereignty, so that, although the conduct is typified in Article 12 of the LSN, it is necessary to add the political motivation. (STF – RC 1468 second, Rel. Min. Ilmar Galvão, Rel. p/ Judgment Min. Maurício Corrêa, DJ 16.8.2000) 

In another trial, the eminent minister Marco Aurélio pointed out: 

The Brazilian legal system does not recognize a political crime whose conceptual characterization results, exclusively, from the motivation of the author of the criminal conduct. To this end, the criminal act must also actually or potentially threaten national security, a legal-political concept which, by being identified in the values referred to in articles 1 and article 2, II, of Law 7170/83 constitutes the very material object of the criminal protection provided by the State to legal assets relevant to the institutional organization in force in Brazil. (SR 160.841 SP, vote of Min. Marco Aurélio, p. 1573). 

Although the constitutional text does not distinguish between the two categories (crimes against national security and political crimes) they ended up being equivalent in the infraconstitutional field, since the National Security Law absorbed political crimes. 

It is true that this hermeneutic aspect has the incidence of the constitutional prohibition of extradition for political crimes, applicable indiscriminately to foreigners and, of course, to Brazilians naturalized at any time. 

As a result, the STF has signed an understanding that political crimes have been incorporated into the infraconstitutional framework with the status of crimes against national security. 

In this case, assimilation to the types provided for in the National Security Act would lead to the question of the peculiar treatment of political offences, in this case, without the Court’s conditions for political offences with violence, it would lead to the hypothesis prohibited by the Federal Constitution. (Article 5 LII shall not grant extradition of aliens for political offences or offences of opinion

If, at the time of the facts, there was no special Brazilian legislation to combat terrorism and if the execution of extradition were assimilated to political crimes, there would be a constitutional obstacle to extradition, and it is worth recalling the historical, firm and eloquent jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court in the protection of those accused of political crimes (HC 33722/DF, Judge Nelson Hungria, trial 28/09/1955: Written record: Political crime. Extradition is not permitted, provided it is not related to the ordinary crime (HC 3372/DF, Rel. Min. Nelson Hungria, First Panel, DJ 

24.11.1955, pp. 15136, Ement. Vol. 00237-02, pp. 00635, Patient: Jacques Charles Noel de Bernonville). 

The second obstacle to extradition, that is to say, its fence in the case of a political offence, is therefore obvious in this case. 

  1. Presentation of the extraditing party to a court or emergency tribunal. Guarantee of due process. 

Finally, a third obstacle to the request for extradition must be examined. The recent Migration Law (Law 13.445/2017) prohibits the granting of extradition when: (Art.82, VIII – the extraditing party has to respond, in the requesting State, before a court or an emergency tribunal;) 

Beyond the simple characterization of a political crime or an emergency tribunal, this Court has already examined thoroughly the scope of the “emergency tribunal” dictum to see a broader scope, which is to ensure a fair trial with due process of law. 

Political instability and even resignations of judges, as well as arrests of opponents to the Government of the requesting state (Edoc 49), can be considered a notorious fact. In such circumstances, there is at least justified doubt as to whether the extraditing party will be effectively subjected to an independent and impartial tribunal, within a framework of institutional normality, safe from exogenous and endogenous instability and pressure. 

The European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2019, approving the 2018 report, condemned the increased scrutiny by the executive and the political pressure on the work of judges and magistrates: 

“(…) 6 Condemns the increasing control by the executive and the political pressure on the work of judges and magistrates; stresses that a thorough reform of the legislative and the judiciary is necessary for Turkey to improve access to the judicial system, to enhance its effectiveness and to provide better protection of the right to be tried within a reasonable time; underlines that these reforms are necessary for Turkey to fulfil its obligations under international human rights law 

It is concerned that the dismissal of more than 4,000 judges and prosecutors constitutes a threat to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary; it also considers that the detention of more than 570 lawyers constitutes an obstacle to the right of defense and a violation of the right to a fair trial; 

It also condemns the arrest and judicial harassment of human rights lawyers; 

Calls on the Working Party on Reform to analyze the judicial reform strategy and make it compliant with the standards required by the EU and the Council of Europe; calls on Turkey to ensure the involvement of all stakeholders, including civil society organizations, throughout the reform process; urges the Commission to monitor the proper use of EU funding for the training of judicial and law enforcement officials, which should not be used to legitimize repressive behavior (European Parliament, Texts Adopted, 13/03/2019, Report 2018 on Turkey). (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA- 8-2019-0200_EN.html.) 

I should also mention that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently rejected four extradition requests made by Turkey in relation to its own nationals for alleged terrorist practice. On April 12th of this year, the Supreme Court confirmed a decision by the ordinary courts in the United Kingdom that had refused to extradite Turkish citizen AKIN IPEK, a businessman accused by the Turkish Government of being involved in the Gulen movement. (https://www.supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/index.html) 

And in the face of such instabilities in the political life of the requesting State, the solution presented, in a court for the protection of individual freedoms, is by the refusal of extradition that one cannot consider with certainty the guarantee of a fair trial according to the constitutional concessions. 

In the 1960s, the Supreme Court faced a similar dilemma. In a context of instability typical of post- revolutionary movements, the Cuban Government requested the extradition of one of its nationals and had the request rejected. The Supreme Court understood, in the lapidary vote of Judge Victor Nunes Leal, that “the lack of guarantees, which is presumed in the court of exception, is what justifies this reservation in the general principle of extradition”. Minister Victor Nunes Leal continued: “In the first case, it is the very configuration of the judicial power that makes extradition difficult; in the second, it is the political environment, agitated by the spirit of the revolution, and marked by the unlimited powers of the Government, that can compromise the functioning of the ordinary courts themselves. In one situation or another, the freedom, security or life of the subject of this extradition case is in danger, and it is these superior goods that the law wishes to protect, when it prohibits the surrender of those who will be tried by an emergency tribunal (Ext. 232/CA – Cuba, Plenary Court, unanimous, DJ 17/12/1960, p. 03947, RTJ vol. 26, p, 1) 

Here is the antiquated precedent of this Supreme Court in scoring that the situation is assimilated to the court by the court of exception. Judge Celso de Mello, dean of this Court, in a lapidary vote on Extradition 1362/DF: “It should be recalled, moreover, that the essentiality of international cooperation in the criminal repression of common crimes does not exempt the Brazilian State – and, in particular, the Federal Supreme Court – from ensuring respect for the fundamental rights of the foreign subject who may suffer, in our country, extradition proceedings initiated by any foreign State. The fact that the foreigner has the legal status of extradition is not sufficient to reduce him/her to a state of submission incompatible with the essential dignity inherent in him/her as a human being and which confers on him/her the ownership of inalienable fundamental rights, among which the guarantee of “due process of law” is insurmountable because of its importance. In matters of 

extradition law, the Federal Supreme Court cannot and must not be indifferent to violations of fundamental procedural guarantees. The fact is that the Brazilian State – which owes unrestricted obedience to the very Constitution that governs its institutional life – has assumed, by virtue of that same political status, the very serious duty of always giving pre-eminence to human rights (art. 4, II). The extradited person thus assumes, in the process of extradition, the unavailability of rights, the inviolability of which must be preserved by the State to which the extradition request was addressed. The possibility of depriving, in a criminal court, of the “due process of law”, in the multiple contours in which this principle is developed, guaranteeing the rights and the very freedom of the accused – guarantee of a broad defense, guarantee of an adversarial procedure, equality between the parties before the natural judge and guarantee of impartiality of the investigating judge – prevents the valid granting of the extradition request (RTJ 134/56-58, Rel. Min. CELSO DE MELLO). 

In summary, in the present case, there are substantial grounds for denying the extradition request, either because of the atypicality of the conduct, the facts imputed to the extradition predate the Brazilian law that criminalized terrorism, or because it appears as a political crime in light of the subsumption of the conduct to the national security law, or because the political instability is evident and there is no guarantee of the judiciary’s predicates and of a fair and impartial trial with due process of law. Also because it does not ensure that the extradited person is guaranteed a fair trial by an independent judge. 

For these reasons, I reject the request for extradition. 

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TAKE ACTION ; Vigil in remembrance of those who died in the Aegean Sea while fleeing from the persecution in Turkey.

On Friday, September 27, 2019, the boat carrying desperate people fleeing persecution in Turkey sank. Seven out of 19 people on the boat passed away.

Mustafa Said Zenbil, 12 years old
Meltem Zenbil, 40 years old
Kevser Sezer, 58 years old
Mahir Isik, 4 months old
Ibrahim Isik, 3 years old
Mustafa Kara, 6 years old
Gulsum Kara, 8 years old

Funerals were held and 2 of the deceased were buried on the slope of Chios with the help of Greek citizens.

While the Greek media published the news as, “The angels escaping from Erdogan lost their lives in the Aegean Sea,” about the unfortunate event, the Turkish media used inappropriate name-calling.

Please join us on Saturday, October 26, 11:00 am -1:00 pm in Bryant Park, New York in remembrance of those who died in the Aegean Sea.

After the collective prayer for those who passed away, flyers with information about this sad event will be distributed.  Cookies will be shared for the benefit of those who passed away.

In Turkey, 278 people have already died due to not being able to stand the persecution, having heart attacks and other serious medical conditions, from torture, while fleeing from persecution, after car accidents, or by the struggle for survival under difficult conditions.

Don’t be silent about this persecution! Take action and come to Bryant Park on Saturday, Oct. 26!

For more information and to find out about all of our activities, please follow us @silencedturkey

Send us an email if you want to participate

Willing contributions of any size are always accepted and appreciated.




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Ahmet Altan (born 1950) is a Turkish journalist, prominent novelist, and author. A working journalist for more than 20 years, he has served in all stages of the profession, from being a night shift reporter to editor in chief in various newspapers and he was the editor-in-chief of Taraf newspaper a liberal newspaper between 2007-2012. Ahmet Altan was arrested on September 10, 2016, in a dawn raid for allegedly giving subliminal messages the night before the failed coup on July 15, 2016. He was charged with attempting to overthrow the “constitutional order,” “interfering with the work of the national assembly,” and “interfering with the work of the government” through violence and sentenced to life in prison. Altan is among thousands of prisoners of conscience in Turkey. We urge the Turkish authorities to free Altan and stop human rights violations against him.

On Thursday, a press release will be made by AST on behalf of the release of journalist and intellectual Ahmet Altan.

Send a letter or video Message for ALTAN:

More details will be shared when the time approaches. You can share your letter and a video message to Ahmet Altan or other political prisoners via AST.


● A special video is being prepared by AST for the release of the political prisoners and will be published on Thursday.
● The press release will be made to the relevant places;
● Social Media campaign will be organized;
● The signature campaign for ALTAN will be launched;
● The issue will be transmitted to international institutions again;


● You can send a letter or video message to Ahmet Altan by yourself or through AST; You can send your message to help@silencedturkey.org
● You can support the campaign that will be held on Thursday;
● You can voluntarily support the work of AST or share your feedback through help@silencedturkey.org
● You can financially support the work of AST by donating to Www.silencedturkey.org/donatenow


Willing contributions of any size are always accepted and appreciated.




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International Women’s Day Messages from all around the World about the women in Turkish jails


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Sexual Assault can not be Justified

We have a right, a responsibility, to speak for women who cannot. #MerveDemirel, with her bravest statement, she spoke for all: “We, as women, should never be ashamed of harassment. It is not us but the perpetrators who should be humiliated.”


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European Parliament Adopts Draft Report on Turkey focused on Human Rights Violations and Call on Suspending Accession Talks

The European Parliament has adopted the draft report on Turkey, that underpins corruption, human rights violations, shut-down of 160 media organizations, violation of rights defenders’ rights, concerns about setbacks in freedom of expression, unjustifiable detention of 150,000 and arrest of 78,000 people, dismissal of more than 4,000 judges and prosecutors and arrest of 570 lawyers. The report expresses concerns that Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs has been used in Europe by the Turkish intelligence services to put pressure on the opposition, particularly on members of the Gulen movement, a religious group blamed by the government for orchestrating the coup attempt. The report also criticizes the actions of the Turkish government against Turkish nationals in third countries, including harassment and kidnappings. While repeating an assertion that human rights and the rule of law have deteriorated in the country, the latest EP report also mentions other problems.
The resolution calls the formal suspension of EU accession talks with Turkey and mentions that a peaceful solution must be found for the rights violations in Turkey. The European Parliament General Assembly will vote on the draft report in the sessions between March 11 and 14. The Parliament’s decisions are advisory and non-binding. The Turkish foreign Ministry on Thursday said the decision of the foreign affairs committee of the European Parliament (EP) advising formal suspension of accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union was absolutely unacceptable.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-21/turkey-faces-crucial-vote-on-eu-accessio n-before-local-ballot


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Binlerce sağlık çalışanının işlerinden tasfiyesi ve Doktor Umut’un hikayesi…

Türkiyedeki cadı avının başlamasından sonra Sağlık Bakanlığı, devlet çalışanlarının işlerinden toplu olarak tasfiyesi kapsamında, birçok hekimide içeren 7.500’den fazla sağlık çalışanının görevlerinden alındığını açıkladı.
Tasfiye, işten çıkarılan hekimlerin ve sağlık çalışanlarının, hükümet tarafından şeytanlaştırılmasından ve isimlerinin medyada yer almasından sonra yeni iş bulmada zorlandıkları için yıkıcı sonuçlar doğurdu.
Uluslararası Af Örgütü, Türk kamu sektörü çalışanlarının kitlesel işten çıkarılmalarına, yaşamları ve geçim kaynakları üzerinde yıkıcı bir etkisi olduğundan dolayı “profesyonel bir imha” adını verdi.

Bununla birlikte, Stockholm Center of Freedom (SCF) tarafından yapılan araştırmalar neticesinde, doktorların, tıp profesörlerinin, hemşirelerin, sağlık teknisyenlerinin ve hastane personellerinin de dahil olduğu 21.000’den fazla sağlık çalışanının şimdiye kadar devlet hastaneleri, Tıp fakülteleri ve sağlık kuruluşlarından işten çıkarıldığını göstermektedir .

Doktor Umut’un hikâyesi, Erdoğan rejiminin siyasi temizliğinin yıkıcı sonuçlarına ışık tutmaktadır.


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Purge of Thousands of Health Care Professionals and Doctor Umut

The Ministry of Health has announced that more than 7,500 health care professionals including many physicians have been dismissed within the scope of a mass purge of government employees from their jobs. The purge has resulted in devastating consequences for dismissed physicians as they face hardship in finding a new position after being demonized by the government and their names plastered all over the media. Amnesty International called the mass dismissal of Turkish public sector workers a “professional annihilation” that has a catastrophic impact on their lives and livelihoods.

However, research carried out by the Stockholm
Center for Freedom (SCF) shows that over 21,000 health care professionals
including doctors, medical professors, nurses, technicians and hospital staff have
thus far been dismissed from public and private hospitals as well as medical schools and associations.

Doctor Umut’s story shed light on the devastating consequences of those political purges by Erdogan’s regime.


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Freedom for Babies

There are more than 700 babies and 17 000 women in jail in Turkey. No more moms and babies should be behind the bars in Turkey.

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